SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM :ELECT POWER DIST & CONT FMEA NO 05-6 -2614 -2 REV:05/03/88

:PANEL MA73C ASSEMBLY P/N RI :MC454-0032-3030

CRIT. HDW:

P/N VENDOR: QUANTITY :2

VEHICLE 102 103 104 EFFECTIVITY: X _X

:TWO

COURSEN

DO X DO X LS PHASE(S): PL LO

PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

QE

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS APPROVED BY (NASA):

CRIT.FUNC:

1R

3

DES R PHILLIPS REL M HOVE

DES 🐅 5-6-58 add mad REL MIND CLATOR 1.2. Common 5/6/8

SSM M.C.Stan RELDE Dentandand Strike アンカルアゼ

ITEM:

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CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3 PHASE, 3 AMP - AC1 (AC3) BUS FEED TO MID MCA 3 (2)

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FOR 3 PHASE FEEDER CIRCUITS FROM AC1 (AC3) BUS TO MIDBODY MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (MCA) NO. 3 (2) FOR VENT DOOR, PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCH, RADIATOR DEPLOY/LATCH, REMOTE MANIPULATOR LATCH AND KU-BAND ANTENNA STOW/DEPLOY MOTORS. 85V73A129CB3 AND CB12

FAILURE MODE:

FAILS CLOSED, FAILS TO OPEN

CAUSE(S):

STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT:
- (A, B, C, D) FIRST FAILURE NO EFFECT. CIRCUIT BREAKER IS NORMALLY CLOSED.
- (E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INADVERTENT PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCH RESULTING IN PARTIAL PAYLOAD BAY DOOR CLOSURE (RESULTS IN AERODYNAMIC STRUCTURAL DAMAGE DURING ENTRY) VIA THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO:
 - CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILED CLOSED.
 - (2) DC LOGIC POWER SWITCH OR RFC FAILED "ON".
 - (3) PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ARM SWITCH FAILS "ON".
 - (4) PSYCHOTIC GPC FAILURE THAT COMMANDS A PAYLOAD BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSED WITH DOOR NOT FULLY CLOSED OR OPEN DURING ASCENT OR ENTRY.

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UBSYSTEM : ELECT POWER DIST & CONT FMEA NO 05-6 -2614 -2 REV:05/03/88

FFECT(S) ON (CONTINUED):

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT:

AILS "B" SCREEN BECAUSE CIRCUIT BREAKERS NORMALLY CLOSED ALL MISSION HASES.

ISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
- B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 VERIFY STARBOARD AND PORT RADIATOR DEPLOY AND STOW MOTOR 1 AND MOTOR 2
 OPERATION INDEPENDENTLY WITH CIRCUIT BREAKERS OPEN/CLOSED TO RESTRICT
 MOTOR OPERATION TO SINGLE MOTOR. TEST IS PERFORMED FOR ALL FLIGHTS.
- E) OPERATIONAL USE NONE